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THE ROLE OF INTIMACY IN THE PROSECUTION
AND SENTENCING OF CAPITAL MURDER CASES
IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, 1984–2005†
CATHERINE M. GROSSO,* DAVID C. BALDUS** &
GEORGE WOODWORTH***
INTRODUCTION
Scholars interested in the intersection between domestic violence and criminal
law have posited that the existence of a domestic or intimate relationship between
a defendant and a victim may act as an “automatic mitigator” in the prosecution of
violent felonies.1 This “tendency to discount the severity of domestic homicide”
has been called the domestic discount or intimacy discount.2 In the context of capi-
tal murder, a domestic discount would prevent an otherwise death-eligible murder
from being identified as appropriate for capital prosecution and conviction and
from receiving a death sentence. While a number of scholars have studied the in-
fluence of a domestic discount on other crimes, very little work has been done in
capital prosecutions and sentencing.3
This article seeks to advance the domestic-discount discussion by considering
whether such a discount exists in the prosecution of death-eligible homicides in the
U.S. military between 1984 and 2005.4 More specifically, this article considers
whether, after all legitimate factors are considered, a death-eligible case involving
a domestic homicide is less likely to be prosecuted as a capital case, less likely to
result in conviction of a death-eligible murder, or less likely to produce an actual
death sentence, than a similarly situated case that is not a domestic homicide.5
† This article is part of a larger project on the U.S. Armed Forces capital punishment system. The
authors acknowledge with gratitude the support of Judy Bellin, Rachel King, Diann Rust-Tierney, and Harwell
Wells in organizing data collection efforts in the District of Columbia; the contributions of law student interns
Keri Foster, Brad Fowler, Joseph Gasper, Akilah Gibson, Abigail Goliber, Liza Grote, Carleen Regnier,
Kenneth Moore, and Danielle Webb who gathered data on the military cases in the District of Columbia; the
Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy judge advocates who assisted the interns in their data collection;
University of Iowa law students Sandra Goveia, Meghan Gruebner, Blake Hogan, Roy Lee, and Katie True
who coded the cases; Erin Dart, Kellie Garrett, and Jonathan Hendricks who made valuable research
contributions; and Lisa Lowenberg who expertly prepared the tables and figures. The authors are grateful for
the support of the American Civil Liberties Union, which supported data collection in the District of
Columbia; the JEHT Foundation, which supported data management and computing; the Cornell Law School
Death Penalty Project; the University of Iowa Law School Foundation, as well as for the pro bono hours
contributed by WilmerHale, Washington, D.C. The authors appreciate the expert assistance of the librarians at
Michigan State University College of Law. They also acknowledge the helpful suggestions on earlier versions
of this article by Jon Gould; participants at a May 2004 judicial conference of the Court of Appeals of the
Armed Forces in Washington, D.C.; the First Annual Empirical Legal Studies Conference at the University of
Texas at Austin School of Law, November 3, 2006; the faculty seminars at the University of Illinois College of
Law, April 2006; and the University of Iowa College of Law, August 14, 2006.
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1. See infra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part III (detailing the data and methodology used for the study).
5. For reasons discussed in Parts II and III, this article identifies a “domestic homicide” as a non-
predatory homicide in which the accused killed his or her sexual intimate. See infra notes 11–13, 54–55 and
accompanying text. A sexual intimate includes a current or former spouse or paramour. There are twenty-five
domestic homicides in the study. There are ten more cases that are used to test the appropriateness of this
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The military criminal justice system presents a particularly interesting jurisdic-
tion for this research for several reasons. First, as discussed in Part III, the law
governing the prosecution and sentencing of capital cases in the military mirrors
the civilian law and, in many respects, the military system tracks the civilian sys-
tem.6 Additionally, it is often reported that the incidence of domestic violence—
out of which many domestic homicides arise—is higher in the military than in the
civilian population.7 Concerns about domestic violence in the military have stimu-
lated a number of academic studies of the phenomenon.8 The studies have identi-
fied high, and sometimes increasing, rates of domestic violence among active duty
military personnel.9
This article progresses in the following parts: Part II presents the theory and the
results of previous studies considering the impact of intimacy on criminal charging
and sentencing. Part III describes the military death penalty system, including the
relevant statute and rules and the charging and sentencing process. Part IV
presents an overview of the data and research methodology used in the study. Part
V presents the results of the study, concluding that a domestic discount operates in
the military capital punishment system, but that this effect is principally the prod-
uct of the sentencing decisions of court-martial members (jurors).10 Part VI dis-
cusses the findings of the study and presents brief conclusions.
definition. Five of the ten are predatory domestic homicides. Five are cases in which the accused killed only his
or her children.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Wife Killings at Fort Reflect Growing Problem in Military, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2002, at A9 (“The recent spate of cases in which soldiers have been charged with killing their
wives . . . reflects a growing problem of domestic violence in the military, lawyers, psychologists and other
experts say.”); Mark Thompson, The Living Room War, TIME, May 23, 1994, at 48 (“[A] confidential—and
unprecedented—Army survey obtained by Time suggests that spousal abuse is occurring in one of every three
Army families each year—double the civilian rate.”).
8. See BATTLE CRIES ON THE HOME FRONT: VIOLENCE IN THE MILITARY FAMILY (Peter J. Mercier
& Judith D. Mercier eds., 2000) (collecting social science research on domestic violence in the military); Amy
D. Marshall, Jillian Panuzio & Casey T. Taft, Intimate Partner Violence Among Military Veterans and Active
Duty Servicemen, 25 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 862, 864–67 (2005) (reviewing existing literature on the preva-
lence of intimate partner violence among active duty servicemen); John H. Newby, James E. McCarroll, Laurie
E. Thayer, Ann E. Norwood, Carol S. Fullerton & Robery J. Ursano, Spouse Abuse by Black and White
Offenders in the U.S. Army, 15 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 199 (2000) (studying the racial demography of spouse abuse
offenders in the U.S. Army during 1989–1997); Leora N. Rosen, Robert J. Kaminski, Angela Moore Parmley,
Kathryn H. Knudson & Peggy Fancher, The Effects of Peer Group Climate on Intimate Partner Violence
Among Married Male U.S. Army Soldiers, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1045 (2003) (studying the combined
impact of individual-level and group-level variables on self-reported intimate partner violence among married
male U.S. Army soldiers).
9. See, e.g., Richard E. Heyman & Peter H. Neidig, A Comparison of Spousal Aggression Prevalence
Rates in U.S. Army and Civilian Representative Samples, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 239, 242
(1999) (reporting that the wives of Army servicemen reported higher rates of moderate and severe husband-
to-wife violence than their demographically matched civilian counterparts (13.1% versus 10.0% for moderate,
and 4.4% versus 2.0% for severe)); David H. Marshall & Marilyn D. McShane, First to Fight: Domestic Vio-
lence and the Subculture of the Marine Corps, in BATTLE CRIES ON THE HOME FRONT: VIOLENCE IN THE
MILITARY FAMILY, supra note 8, at 15, 20 (“Since 1988, the number of domestic violence cases reported to the
Department of Defense has increased, even though the military population has declined each year. . . .”); see
also Peter J. Mercier, Introduction: Violence in the Military Family, in BATTLE CRIES ON THE HOME FRONT:
VIOLENCE IN THE MILITARY FAMILY, supra note 8, at 3, 3–4 (reporting that “[a]lthough domestic violence
statistics comparing civilian and military families are limited, relevant literature suggests that military families
are at a particularly high risk for family violence because of assorted demographic variables and various stres-
sors affecting the family unit,” and discussing ten studies on domestic violence in the military).
10. Capital sentencing hearings must be held by a general court-martial. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL UNITED STATES, Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 201(f)(2)(C). A general court-martial is the
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II. THE DOMESTIC DISCOUNT: THEORY AND
CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP
Donald Black posited that, in any area of law, as the relationship between the
defendant and the victim moves from one of strangers to one of intimates, the
likelihood that the legal system will take the matter seriously ebbs.11 When consid-
ering the charging and sentencing of defendants accused of death-eligible murder,
this theory suggests that the death penalty would be most common in cases of
stranger murder and least common in cases involving the murder of an intimate.12
Elizabeth Rapaport called this tendency to discount the seriousness of a domestic
homicide “the domestic discount.”13
Preconceived expectations of officials and individuals responsible for charging
and sentencing may lead these government officials to investigate and prosecute
domestic homicides differently than non-domestic homicides.14 For example, in the
context of homicide, evidence of provocation can reduce a murder charge to man-
slaughter.15 Charging and sentencing authorities may assume that perpetrators of
domestic homicides act under provocation, or at least that the perpetrators act in
the midst of some kind of strong emotions that might reduce the perpetrator’s
culpability.16 The key question in each case, however, is whether the actual level of
highest military trial court and has jurisdiction over all armed forces. A general court martial proceeding
presided is over by a military judge with at least five jurors (“members”). See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 413
(9th ed. 2009). There must be at least twelve members in capital cases unless twelve members “are not reason-
ably available because of physical conditions or military exigencies.” See 10 U.S.C. § 825(a) (2006).
11. DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 40–44 (1976). This theory has been frequently tested and
contested. For example, Professor Carolyn Ramsey’s study of Colorado and New York City murder cases
between 1880 and 1920 found that “concern with self-control and protectiveness toward women” led to aggres-
sive prosecution of men who killed their intimates. She noted, however, that female intimate murder defend-
ants were almost uniformly exonerated or acquitted of murder in the same period. Carolyn B. Ramsey,
Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880–1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 177–78 (2006).
12. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 44. In this article, a homicide in which a defendant kills his or her
present or former spouse or paramour will be referred to as a “domestic homicide.”
13. Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Mur-
der in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1996) [hereinafter Rapaport, Capital Murder].
14. See Myrna Dawson, Rethinking the Boundaries of Intimacy at the End of the Century: The Role of
Victim-Defendant Relationship in Criminal Justice Decisionmaking over Time, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105, 106
(2004) (discussing and summarizing research on the use by criminal court personnel of screening devices based
on preconceived expectations about crimes and criminals); Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount:
Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 702 (2006)
(noting that crimes between intimates “are typically understood as driven by strong emotions and as embed-
ded in preexisting complex relationships among the parties involved”); Terance D. Miethe, Stereotypical Con-
ceptions and Criminal Processing: The Case of The Victim-Offender Relationship, 4 JUST. Q. 571, 571–73 (1987)
(reviewing the theoretical background for his research on stereotypical conceptions and criminal processing);
William B. Waegel, Case Routinization in Investigative Police Work, 28 SOC. PROBS. 263 (1981) (reviewing the
background for his research on handling criminal incidents in a city police detective division).
15. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001) (“Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter
when . . .a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.”); see also Rapaport, Capital
Murder, supra note 13, at 1536–39 (discussing the “heat of passion” defense to homicide).
16. Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 380
(1991) (arguing that when a quarrel between intimates results in murder, society is predisposed to assume that
the victim provoked the murder even when the facts would not legally support the reduction of a murder
charge to manslaughter); see also Levine, supra note 14, at 702 (noting that “the victim who knows her assail-
ant may be perceived as having somehow incited the assailant’s behavior”); Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra
note 13, at 1508 (“The killing of kin and sexual intimates tends to be read by the law as mitigated by the
stresses of domestic life. . . .”).
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emotion or provocation achieved the level required under criminal law to make
out a legally valid defense.17 None of the defendants in this study appear to have
raised a defense of provocation.
Prosecutors, alternately, may perceive or assume that jurors will have less em-
pathy for victims of intimate homicides and, therefore, be less likely to convict.18
Such behavior on the part of jurors or perceptions on the part of prosecutors may
arise from the historical tendency to consider domestic matters private, leading the
state to be slow and reluctant to intervene.19 Alternately, prosecutors and police
may perceive the victims of domestic crimes as less credible, leading them to con-
clude that domestic homicides are more difficult to prosecute to a conviction.20
Another theory suggests that domestic cases are discounted based not on the
relationship between the defendant and victim, but because the defendant and the
victim typically come from the same economic class and race, and that cases within
economic classes and races tend to be treated more leniently than cases involving
“upward crime.”21
Quite apart from the plausible reasons for such a discount lies the question of
whether such a discount exists in the first place. Studies considering the merit of
Black’s theory that intimacy will have a mitigating effect on case charging and
sentencing have been inconclusive at best.22 Such a mitigating effect has been iden-
tified most consistently in studies that conducted stage-wise analyses on specific
crimes. Studies that separately analyzed the decision-making at each stage of the
charging and sentencing process typically identified a discount at one or more
stages. For example, in her well-controlled study of homicides in Toronto, Myrna
Dawson identified a domestic discount in the decision to charge a case as first
degree murder; the decision to send a case to trial rather than accepting a guilty
plea; and in the imposition of sentence length. Dawson did not, however, identify
17. See Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 13, at 1509 (critiquing the treatment of provocation in
capital murder prosecutions).
18. Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideol-
ogies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531, 536 (1997) (stating that research shows that
jurors are less likely to convict if they do not feel empathetic to the victim); see also Levine, supra note 14, at
706 (discussing Frohmann’s research); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION
AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY’S COURTS 135–36 (1977), available at http://www.vera.org/download?
file=882/1410.pdf.
19. See Levine, supra note 14, at 695.
20. Miethe, supra note 14, at 574 (reviewing the theoretical background for his research on stereotypi-
cal conceptions and criminal processing). Others have suggested that a domestic discount may result from the
fact that evidence can be more difficult to collect in cases involving intimates, thereby making cases involving
intimates more difficult to prosecute. See Kenneth Adams, The Effect of Evidentiary Factors on Charge Reduc-
tion, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 525, 535 (1983) (concluding that the victim-offender relationship may be correlated with
the reliability of the victims in providing evidence in felony cases in the District of Columbia).
21. See Kathleen J. Ferraro & Tascha Boychuk, The Court’s Response to Interpersonal Violence: A
Comparison of Intimate and Nonintimate Assault, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE RESPONSE 209, 222–23 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (defining upward crime as crime by
people of a lower economic class against people of a higher economic class).
22. Two recent papers provide a thorough review of previous research in this area and reached slightly
different conclusions about whether studies generally support the finding of a domestic discount. Compare
Levine, supra note 14, at 693 (noting that “most [scholars who undertake quantitative analysis of Black’s
theory] conclud[e] that Black’s theory holds true: intimacy tends to benefit the defendant, at least for some
crimes and at some stages of the criminal process”) with Dawson, supra note 14, at 106 (“A systematic exami-
nation of findings from relevant research . . . does not allow for any conclusive statement regarding the role
of intimacy in law.”).
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the domestic discount in the severity of conviction (murder versus manslaughter)
or in the verdict at trial.23
In a broader study, considering violent felonies in Alaska involving personal
confrontations between the victim and the offender, Terance Miethe found that
cases involving known victims were significantly more likely to be dismissed in the
initial screening decision and after the initial screening but before trial, and less
likely to receive a prison sentence.24 He noted, however, that the effects that the
presence of a known victim had on the case weakened in later stages of process-
ing.25 Miethe also reported on the importance of individually controlled variables
at different stages of charging and sentencing, noting, for example, that the sever-
ity of the charge and use of a weapon did not gain importance in non-stranger
cases.26 These kinds of controls add strength to his study.27
In a third example, Leonore Simon’s study of male offenders who had been
sentenced and incarcerated for violent crimes in Arizona, found that non-stranger
offenders are charged with and convicted of more serious crimes than stranger
offenders, but that stranger offenders receive significantly longer sentences than
non-stranger offenders.28 These findings highlight the importance of analyzing the
decisions at each stage of charging and sentencing.
Much of the theoretical and empirical work considering the potential and actual
impact of a domestic discount looks generally at violent felonies within a jurisdic-
tion.29 Research suggests, however, that it is important where possible to focus on a
23. Dawson, supra note 14, at 120–25, tbl.2 (noting that defendants who killed intimate partners were
significantly less likely to be charged with first degree murder than other types of defendants (odds ratio 0.572,
p = 0.05); these defendants were significantly less likely to have their cases resolved at trial (odds ratio 0.398, p
= 0.01); and these defendants received significantly lighter sentences than other defendants (b = 1.293, p =
0.05)).
24. Miethe, supra note 14, at 582–84, tbls.2, 3 & 4 (comparing stranger crimes to nonstranger crimes).
Miethe analyzed 2,173 felony cases in Alaska between 1974 and 1976. He coded for twenty independent vari-
ables including offender characteristics, offense characteristics, case processing attributes including a five-item
scale on evaluating the strength of the evidence, and procedural information. He modeled successive stages of
charging and sentencing. His paper reports standardized regression coefficients. These coefficients indicate the
direction and magnitude of the effect. Miethe reported the following coefficients for the findings presented
above: more likely to be dismissed at the initial screening, 0.42, p = 0.10; more likely to be dismissed before
trial, 0.47, p = 0.10; and less likely to receive prison sentence, –0.45, not significant. Id. at 577–87.
25. Id. at 587–88.
26. Id. at 584–85.
27. As noted above, Miethe estimated regression models for each decision point. Each model had more
than ten independent variables. Id. at 579 tbl.1, 583 tbl.2, 585 tbl.3, 586 tbl.4.
28. Leonore M.J. Simon, Legal Treatment of the Victim-Offender Relationship in Crimes of Violence, 11
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 94, 100–02 (1996) (comparing stranger crimes to non-stranger crimes). Simon
studied 273 incarcerated, sentenced offenders in Arizona. They had been convicted of homicide, rape, kidnap-
ping, robbery, and assault. She reported on offender characteristics, type of crime, victim information, pres-
ence of a weapon, and case processing information. She did not have variables on strength of evidence or
other charging details. This study also reported regression coefficients: charged with more serious crimes:
0.123, p = 0.05; convicted of more serious crimes: 0.128, p = 0.05; sentence length –0.87, p = 0.05. Id.
29. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 20 (considering all felony prosecutions in the District of Columbia in
1974 in which the defendant pled guilty); Celesta A. Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial
Discretion, 38 SOC. PROBS. 247, 250 (1991) (considering 2,158 prosecutions in the District of Columbia in
1974); Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim Participation in Sentencing on Sentencing Out-
comes, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 451, 454 (1990) (considering 500 felony cases in Ohio between June 1985 and January
1988); Cassia Spohn & Jeffrey Spears, Gender and Case Processing Decisions: A Comparison of Case Out-
comes for Male and Female Defendants Charged with Violent Felonies, 8 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 29, 34 (1997)
(considering all defendants originally charged with one of eleven violent felonies in Detroit in 1976, 1977, and
1978).
278 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
single felony.30 Several studies that begin with a broad look at violent felonies find
that a domestic discount operates with respect to some crimes but not others. For
example, Kristen Williams found that the victim-defendant relationship impacted
the decision to prosecute or dismiss simple assault cases, but that the relationship
did not appear to influence decisions on robberies or forcible sex offenses.31
Miethe’s study found that a domestic discount appeared to operate at all stages of
rape cases, and that rape cases were affected by the domestic discount much more
than all other crimes. Rape cases were dismissed before trial 63% of the time in
intimate cases, but only 29% of the time in stranger cases. In contrast, all other
crimes were dismissed 51% of the time in intimate cases and 47% in stranger
cases.32 The importance of a narrow focus may be particularly important in the
highly specialized area of capital punishment.
Previous studies also suggest the importance of distinguishing intimate homi-
cides from murders involving other family members, including children, or ac-
quaintances.33 A study that considers only whether the victim was known or
unknown—i.e., whether the victim was a stranger or a non-stranger—risks “mask-
ing” differences in treatment between intimates, children, and other family mem-
bers.34 Myrna Dawson’s study of the impact of intimacy in homicide prosecutions
found that, while defendants who killed friends were not treated more leniently
than those who killed strangers,35 defendants who killed intimates were less likely
than those who killed strangers to be charged with first degree murder36 and
brought to trial37 and they were more likely to receive lighter sentences.38
Williams’ research on violent crimes in Washington, D.C., also illustrates the
importance of this distinction. She found that cases in which the victim was mar-
30. Cf. Dawson, supra note 14, at 110 n.4 (noting that, while some research has criticized homicide as
too narrow a crime category on the theory that it irrationally excludes closely related violent offenses such as
assault, a study on homicide avoids potential problems such as reporting bias or biases resulting from dropped
cases).
31. Kristen M. Williams, The Effects of Victim Characteristics on the Disposition of Violent Crimes, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM 177, 198–201 (William F. McDonald ed., 1976) (finding the significance of
different victim-spouse relationships to vary by type of crime).
32. Miethe, supra note 14, at 584, 587–88.
33. See, e.g., Julia Horney & Cassia Spohn, The Influence of Blame and Believability Factors on the
Processing of Simple Versus Aggravated Rape Cases, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 135, 140 (1996) (arguing that dynamics
of official decision-making in cases involving children merit separate analysis of cases in which the only victims
are children).
34. Scott H. Decker, Exploring Victim-Offender Relationships in Homicide: The Role of Individual
Event and Characteristics, 10 JUST. Q. 585, 588–93 (1993) (arguing for the need to expand beyond the division
of homicide into stranger and non-stranger crimes); Levine, supra note 14, at 705 (predicting that intimacy
between a defendant and a victim may yield the most significant discount); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran,
Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers,
Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 659, 673–74 (2001) (raising doubts about the reliability
of previous studies that did not find differences in the charging and sentencing of rape and sexual assault cases
between strangers and non-strangers).
35. Dawson, supra note 14, at 128–29, 121 tbl.2 (odds ratio between 0.82 and 0.95, not significant).
36. Id. at 120, 121 tbl.2 (odds ratio 0.57, p < 0.05).
37. Id. at 123, 121 tbl.2 (odds ratio 0.40, p < 0.01).
38. Id. at 125, 121 tbl.2 (regression coefficient –1.29, p < 0.05); cf. Albonetti, supra note 29, at 261 (not
identifying any relationship between treatment among three categories of defendant-victim relationship: inti-
mates, acquaintances, and strangers); Simon, supra note 28, at 103 (finding a domestic discount at some stages
of the criminal justice process in a study distinguishing only strangers and non-strangers); Spohn & Holleran,
supra note 34, at 673–74 (not identifying any differences between the treatments of acquaintances and inti-
mates in a study of rape cases).
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ried to the defendant were more likely to be dismissed without prosecution than
cases between a child and parent, or another family member.39 Other research has
illuminated unique difficulties in charging and prosecuting cases in which a parent
has killed his or her child or children, including the difficulty of identifying mo-
tives, the typical lack of external injuries, public difficulties in believing that par-
ents hurt their children, and, sometimes, the use of mental health defenses.40
Regardless of whether the child-only victim cases are aggravating or mitigating as
a set, the best practice suggested by earlier work is to distinguish intimates from
the defendant’s children, other family members, acquaintances, and strangers.
The importance of introducing appropriate controls for legal and extralegal fac-
tors that might affect prosecution and sentencing outcomes, other than the rela-
tionship between the defendant and the victim, is also clear in the literature.
Studies employing bivariate analyses are more likely to identify a domestic dis-
count than studies that introduce more controls.41 While a number of studies con-
sider control factors relating to characteristics of the defendant (race, gender, age),
characteristics of victim (race, gender, age, relation to defendant), and characteris-
tics of the crime (such as the presence of a gun or the seriousness of the crime),
very few control for factors such as strength of evidence or culpability.42 In addi-
tion, many studies analyze data on multiple crimes in one group. This leads to
additional complexity that is difficult to parse.43
Dawson’s study focused exclusively on homicides and introduced more controls
than other studies. In addition to considering basic information about the relation-
ship between defendants and alleged victims, and using detailed case procedure
coding, Dawson introduced the use of controls for factors intended to assess culpa-
bility. These factors included a defendant’s role in the crime, the number of de-
fendants, and the number of victims.44 She also introduces controls for time.45
These kinds of factors are particularly important in the context of capital charging
and sentencing where the decision-makers are required to consider factors beyond
the finding of premeditated or felony murder in decision-making.
39. Williams, supra note 31, at 198–99, tbl.9 (62% (spouse) versus 38% (child/parent) or 57% (other
family member)).
40. See Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide: A Statutory Proposal, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 535, 538 (1999) (identifying difficulties prosecuting parent-child homicide cases); see also Eliza-
beth Rapaport, Mad Women and Desperate Girls: Infanticide and Child Murder in Law and Myth, 33 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 527, 528, 534–38 (2006) (summarizing myths about infanticide and child murder and noting that
prosecutors have difficulty in prosecuting child murder cases successfully).
41. See Dawson, supra note 14, at 107–08 (discussing several studies, including Ferraro & Boychuk,
supra note 21; HENRY LUNDSGAARDE, MURDER IN SPACE CITY: A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF HOUSTON
HOMICIDE PATTERNS (1977); Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 13).
42. See Erez & Tontodonato, supra note 29, at 455 (detailing information on defendant and victim
characteristics, plea information, presence of private defense attorney, measure of “offense seriousness”); see
also Spohn & Spears, supra note 29, at 38–40 (detailing information on defendant and victim characteristics,
outcome of prosecution, “offense seriousness” measure, presence of private defense attorney, availability of
bail, and presence of gun).
43. See sources cited in supra note 29 (citing studies looking at multiple crimes).
44. See Dawson, supra note 14, at 114–18 (discussing each variable and how it is coded).
45. See id. at 126–28.
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An additional matter of concern for the study is the question of time. Many
domestic discount studies focus on a single year or a very short span of years.46 The
cases in this study span more than twenty years. It is at least arguable that society
and public officials have become more sensitive to domestic violence during the
last twenty years and, as a result, the tendency to discount domestic homicides may
have dissipated.47 Dawson is the only other scholar to have considered the impact
of time. When comparing the effect of intimacy in cases that entered the criminal
justice system in 1984 or earlier to cases that entered in 1985 or later, she found the
effects discussed above to result entirely from cases in the earlier period.48 In con-
trast, the latter period showed “no evidence of leniency at any stage of the criminal
justice process for any victim-offender relationship type.”49 This study provides an
opportunity to test this finding in another context.
One issue this study does not address is the question of whether women defend-
ants are treated more leniently than men. A number of scholars have addressed
this issue.50 Related scholarship has focused on whether victim gender impacts
charging and sentencing decisions.51 Because the military database includes only
one female accused who killed her male intimate, the only adult male intimate
victim, the authors have not explored this issue further.
Focusing more precisely on studies of the domestic discount in capital charging
and sentencing systems, the authors are aware of only one study of death-eligible
homicides in which the defendant killed his or her intimate.52 Rapaport studied “all
women sentenced to death in the United States over a twelve year period,
1978–89, and all men sentenced to death in six states . . . whose cases had been
heard on direct appeal from 1976–91”53 to identify the characteristics of the domes-
tic homicides that resulted in a death sentence. That study provides valuable in-
sight into the ranking of domestic homicides in terms of perpetrator culpability
46. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 20, at 528 (one year); Albonetti, supra note 29, at 250 (one year); Erez
& Tontodonato, supra note 29, at 454 (two years, six months); Spohn & Spears, supra note 29, at 34 (three
years).
47. See Dawson, supra note 14, at 109 (noting the passage of the legislative and policy initiatives in-
tended to change the way police, prosecutors, and courts respond to domestic violence).
48. Id. at 126.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Effects of Gender on Charge Reduction, 25
SOC. Q. 385 (1984); Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 22 CRIME & JUST. 201
(1997); Ilene H. Nagel & John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, 4
CRIME & JUST. 91 (1983); Ramsey, supra note 11; Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 13.
51. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide Cases and the Role of Vengeance, 32
J. LEGAL STUD. 363 (2003).
52. Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 13. At least two other capital charging and sentencing studies
consider the significance of the victim-defendant relationship as part of a larger project considering the role of
race. Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sen-
tencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 58–60 (1984) (“Those who killed strangers were far
more likely to be sentenced to death than those who killed family members, friends, or acquaintances: ten
times as likely in Georgia, four times as likely in Florida, and over six times as likely in Illinois. . . . [But,
c]ontrolling for the relationship of the suspect to the victim . . . does little to change the pattern of disparities
in capital sentencing by the race of the victim.”); Marian R. Williams & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Racial Disparity
and Death Sentences in Ohio, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 207, 215 (2001) (“[H]omicides involving strangers were more
likely (1.8 odds ratio) to result in a death sentence than homicides involving nonstrangers.”).
53. Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 13, at 1513. Professor Rapaport included all women sen-
tenced to death due to the limited number of women on death row. She limited the study to a sample of men
sentenced to death in six states because the population of men on death row is so large. Id.
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and the factors that may be important to culpability. It does not, however, com-
pare domestic or intimate homicides to similarly situated nondomestic or stranger
homicides to determine whether the fact that a case is domestic had a mitigating
effect on cases’ prosecution and sentencing.54
Rapaport’s research suggests the importance of distinguishing predatory from
passionate domestic homicides. Rapaport defined a passionate homicide as one in
which “the killers acted under the influence of powerful and painful emotions, out
of hurt and anger of the sort that respectable people, [such as] ourselves, recognize
as normal experience.”55 This type of passionate killing arguably brings to mind the
defense of heat of passion and suggests lowered culpability.56 In contrast, a preda-
tory killing is typically motivated by pecuniary gain.57 Rapaport pointed out that a
predatory domestic homicide—a crime motivated by economic gain that ensnares
a domestic victim—differs from a case arising from domestic violence. Studying
the predatory cases does not provide information about “domestic violence and
the law’s role in defining, censuring, preventing (and perpetuating), and punishing
domestic violence.”58
This article builds on the body of research described in this Part both with re-
spect to its findings and methodology.
III. THE MILITARY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM
Capital punishment has long existed in the U.S. Armed Forces.59 There are fif-
teen death-eligible offenses in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).60 All
but two of the offenses relate to crimes with important national security or military
54. See id. at 1515–16. Rapaport found that a domestic homicide is most likely to result in a death
sentence when it involves pecuniary gain, a felony, multiple victims, or extreme brutality. See id. at 1514–15.
For male defendants, the most common aggravators among domestic homicide cases that correlated with a
death sentence were extreme brutality (48%), felony (35%), multiple victims (20%), or a prior record of
violence (16%). Id. at 1515.
55. Id. at 1516.
56. Id. A predisposition toward this mitigation and possible defense may explain the presence of a
domestic discount. See supra Part III. Rapaport analyzes several court decisions from which she argues against
the expansive reach of these defenses in the domestic homicides thereby discouraging capital prosecutions of
domestic homicides. Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 13, at 1519–47; see also Levine, supra note 14, at
702–03 (discussing the different legal and social responses to predatory and passionate crimes).
57. Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 13, at 1514.
58. See id. at 1518.
59. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,752–54 (1996) (describing the history of capital punish-
ment in the U.S. Armed Forces).
60. Capital offenses under the military capital punishment framework are those offenses for which
death is an expressly authorized punishment under Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial or under the law
of war. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1003(b)(9)
(2008). Death may be adjudged when an accused is convicted by a concurrence of all members on the court
present during a vote, when procedural requirements are met, and when at least one aggravating factor is
found. R.C.M. 1004. There are fifteen capital offenses when considering mutiny and sedition as separate of-
fenses (mutiny and sedition are enumerated under the same section of the United States Code and Punitive
Article of the Manual for Courts-Martial United States) and when attempt crimes and failure to suppress
crimes (such as attempted mutiny and failure to suppress mutiny or sedition) are considered as part of the
more broadly defined offenses (for example, mutiny and sedition respectively). Those offenses are: desertion,
assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioner officer, mutiny, sedition, misbehavior before the en-
emy, subordinate compelling surrender, improper use of countersign, forcing a safeguard, aiding the enemy,
spying, espionage, improper hazarding of vessel, misbehavior of sentinel or lookout, murder, and rape. See
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, Punitive Articles 85, 90, 94, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 110,
113, 118, 120 (2008); R.C.M. 104(c)(9) (2008).
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implications that have no counterparts in civilian death penalty systems. The
crimes in the national security category include mutiny, and sedition and espio-
nage.61 Eight death-eligible offenses with serious military implications apply only
“in time of war” or during combat operations against a foreign power.62 Some of-
fenses with military implications do not have a “time of war” requirement.63 To the
authors’ knowledge, these offences, while long-standing, have not been applied
since the Korean War.
The fourteenth and fifteenth death-eligible offenses are those UCMJ offenses
with civilian death penalty counterparts: murder (premeditated and felony mur-
der)64 and rape (of a person twelve or younger or resulting in maiming or death),65
committed by U.S. military personnel, during peacetime, anywhere in the world.66
A murder conviction is the basis of all of the military death sentences imposed
since 1960.67 This study included only murder cases.
61. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, Punitive Articles 94, 106.
62. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 885, 890, 901, 906, 913 (2006) (describing the non-homicidal military specific
crimes for which a death sentence may be given only during times of war: desertion (and attempted desertion),
assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer, improper use of a countersign, spying, misbe-
havior of sentinel).
63. See id. §§ 894, 899, 900, 902, 904, 906a, 910 (describing the non-homicidal military-specific crimes
without any explicit requirement that the offense be committed during wartime for a death sentence to be
applicable: mutiny (and attempted mutiny), sedition, failure to suppress mutiny or sedition, misbehavior
before the enemy, subordinate compelling surrender, forcing a safeguard, aiding the enemy (and attempting to
aid the enemy), espionage, and improper hazarding of vessel).
64. Id. § 918 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (“Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or
excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he—(1) has a premeditated design to kill; (2) intends to kill or
inflict great bodily harm; (3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a
wanton disregard of human life; or (4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary,
sodomy, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual
contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer
such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he shall
suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.”).
65. See id. § 920(a) (Supp. 2009) (“Any person subject to this chapter who causes another person of
any age to engage in a sexual act by—(1) using force against that person; (2) causing grievous bodily harm to
any person; (3) threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death,
grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping; (4) rendering another person unconscious; or (5) administering to an-
other person by force or threat of force, or without the knowledge or permission of that person, a drug,
intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby substantially impairs the ability of that other person to
appraise or control conduct; is guilty of rape and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”). A 2007
amendment removed death as a penalty listed in the statutory language for the offense of rape, but the Rules
for Courts-Martial retain capital punishment if the appropriate aggravating factors are present. Compare 10
U.S.C. § 920 (2006) with 10 U.S.C. § 920 (Supp. 2007), R.C.M. 1004(c)(6), and R.C.M. 1004(c)(9). In 1977, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Coker v. Georgia that the death penalty is unconstitutional as excessive punish-
ment for the rape of an adult woman. See 433 U.S. 584 (1977). The U.S. Air Force Court of Military review
held that Coker was binding, making the rape of an adult woman a non-capital case. See United States v.
McReynolds, 9 M.J. 881, 882 (A.F.C.M.R. 1980). More recently, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court held that
death was a cruel and unusual punishment, unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution, for the rape of a
child. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). In a denial of rehearing the Court chose not to address capital prosecutions for
rape under the UCMJ. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2008) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., respecting denial of rehearing) (“[W]e need not decide whether certain
considerations might justify differences in the application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to
military cases (a matter not presented here for our decision).”).
66. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918 (2006 & Supp. 2009), 920(a) (Supp. 2009).
67. See generally Dwight H. Sullivan, Killing Time: Two Decades of Military Capital Litigation, 189 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (2006).
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A. Death-Eligible Murder Under the UCMJ
The UCMJ does not require a connection between a murder and any military
interest or function for a defendant to be death eligible.68 Rather, as a condition for
imposing a death sentence, court-martial members must find “beyond a reasonable
doubt” that one or more “aggravating factors” exist and that “any extenuating or
mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating
circumstances.”69
Rule 1004 of the Manual for Courts-Martial limits death eligibility for murder
with aggravating circumstances similarly to the limits for death-eligibility found in
many civilian jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code.70 In cases involving a felony-
murder conviction, Rule 1004(c) defines separate aggravating factors.71 These ag-
gravating factors, listed in Rule 1004(c) at the end of this subsection, also mirror a
majority of civilian jurisdictions.72 The rule does not list specific mitigating circum-
stances. Rather it provides that the accused “shall be given broad latitude to pre-
sent evidence in extenuation and mitigation.”73 As is the case in every civilian
statute of which the authors are aware, there is no mention in the UCMJ, or in the
relevant rules, of the appropriate impact of the accused-victim relationship on
charging or sentencing.
Manual for Courts-Martial Rule 1004(c)(2) (2008)
(c) Aggravating factors. Death may be adjudged only if the members find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the following aggravating
factors:
. . . .
(2) That in committing the offense the accused—
(A) Knowingly created a grave risk of substantial damage to the na-
tional security of the United States; or
(B) Knowingly created a grave risk of substantial damage to a mission,
system, or function of the United States, provided that this subparagraph
shall apply only if substantial damage to the national security of the United
States would have resulted had the intended damage been effected;
68. Although the Supreme Court during the late 1960s found that courts-martial only had jurisdiction
to try servicemen when the crime was “service connected,” O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969), the
“service connection” requirement was abandoned by the Supreme Court in 1987, when the Court held that
court-martial jurisdiction was established by one factor—the military status of the accused. Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987).
69. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1004
(b)(4)(A)–(C), (c) (2008). The Rule uses the phrase “aggravating factors” in most instances. In 1004 (b)(4)(C),
“aggravating circumstances” includes the aggravating factors discussed in Part II.
70. Compare R.C.M. 1004, with, e.g., NMSA 1978 § 31-20A-5 (1981), and MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6
3–4 (1962). Only one part of one aggravating factor for capital murder is uniquely tailored to military circum-
stances. This aggravating factor (7G) classifies as death-eligible the premeditated murder of a “commissioned,
warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer of the armed services of the United States” killed “in the execu-
tion of office” when the accused had knowledge of the victim’s status. R.C.M. 1004(c)(7)(G). The balance of
the 7G aggravating factor reflects an effort to provide special protection for law enforcement and corrections
officers that is found in most civilian jurisdictions.
71. See R.C.M. 1004(c).
72. Compare, e.g., R.C.M. 1004(c)(1)–(9), with, e.g., NMSA 1978 § 31-20A-5 (1981), and MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 210.6 3–4 (1962).
73. R.C.M. 1004(b)(3).
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(3) That the offense caused substantial damage to the national security of
the United States, whether or not the accused intended such damage, ex-
cept that this factor shall not apply in the case of a violation of Article 118
or 120;
(4) That the offense was committed in such a way or under factors that the
lives of persons other than the victim, if any, were unlawfully and substan-
tially endangered, except that this factor shall not apply to a violation of
Articles 104, 106a, or 120;
(5) That the accused committed the offense with the intent to avoid hazard-
ous duty;
(6) That, only in the case of a violation of Article 118 or 120, the offense
was committed in time of war and in territory in which the United States or
an ally of the United States was then an occupying power or in which the
armed forces of the United States were then engaged in active hostilities;
(7) That, only in the case of a violation of Article 118(1):
(A) The accused was serving a sentence of confinement for 30 years or
more or for life at the time of the murder;
(B) The murder was committed while the accused was engaged in the
commission or attempted commission of any robbery, rape, rape of a child,
aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault of a child, aggravated
sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual con-
tact with a child, aggravated arson, sodomy, burglary, kidnapping, mutiny,
sedition, or piracy of an aircraft or vessel; . . . or, while the accused was
engaged in flight or attempted flight after the commission or attempted
commission of any such offense.
(C) The murder was committed for the purpose of receiving money or a
thing of value;
(D) The accused procured another by means of compulsion, coercion, or
a promise of an advantage, a service, or a thing of value to commit the
murder;
(E) The murder was committed with the intent to avoid or to prevent
lawful apprehension or effect an escape from custody or confinement;
(F) The victim was the President of the United States, the President-
elect, the Vice President, or, if there was no Vice President, the officer in
the order of succession to the office of President of the United States, the
Vice-President-elect, or any individual who is acting as President under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, any Member of Congress (in-
cluding a Delegate to, or Resident Commissioner in, the Congress) or
Member-of-Congress elect, justice or judge of the United States, a chief of
state or head of government (or the political equivalent) of a foreign na-
tion, or a foreign official (as such term is defined in section 1116(b)(3)(A)
of title 18, United States Code), if the official was on official business at the
time of the offense and was in the United States or in a place described in
Mil. R. Evid. 315(c)(2) or 315(c)(3);
(G) The accused then knew that the victim was any of the following
persons in the execution of office: a commissioned, warrant, noncommis-
sioned, or petty officer of the armed services of the United States; a mem-
ber of any law enforcement or security activity or agency, military or
civilian, including correctional custody personnel; or any firefighter;
(H) The murder was committed with intent to obstruct justice;
(I) The murder was preceded by the intentional infliction of substantial
physical harm or prolonged, substantial mental or physical pain and suffer-
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ing to the victim. For purposes of this section, “substantial physical harm”
means fractures or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body,
serious damage to internal organs, or other serious bodily injuries. The
term “substantial physical harm” does not mean minor injuries, such as a
black eye or bloody nose. The term “substantial mental or physical pain or
suffering” is accorded its common meaning and includes torture.
(J) The accused has been found guilty in the same case of another viola-
tion of Article 118;
(K) The victim of the murder was under 15 years of age.
B. Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases
Under military law and practice, the death penalty statute is applied in a three-
stage process by two decision-makers—the convening authority and the court-mar-
tial members. The three stages are depicted in Figure 1 (below).
A capital prosecution in a death-eligible case is commenced by the “convening
authority,” normally a general or admiral in the accused’s command,74 who has
FIGURE 1. Capital Charging and Sentencing Outcomes Among Death-Eligible
Cases: U.S. Military, 1984–2005
Stage 1 







Case Advances to a
Capital Sentence Hearing 


















Death Sentencing Rate Among 
All Death Eligible Cases 
3A 3B 16% (15/96) 
The cases of the eight accused acquitted of capital murder by members are not 
included in this Figure. Their cases are included in the analysis of convening authority
charging decisions.
74. 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDERIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 8-13.32 (3d.
ed. 2006).
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total discretion whether or not to seek a death sentence in a death-eligible case.75
A decision to seek a death sentence in the case is known as a “capital referral.” A
capital referral is heavily influenced by the “advice letter” written by the com-
mander’s Staff Judge Advocate (his chief legal advisor), or by the commander’s
legal officer.76
If a case is capitally charged and the capital referral is not withdrawn by the
convening authority, the case advances to a capital court-martial with the govern-
ment seeking a death sentence.77 At decision two, a unanimous finding of guilt by
the court-martial members will advance the case to a capital sentencing hearing, or
stage two.78 At decision three, court-martial members consider the aggravating fac-
tors and mitigating circumstances and make a life or death determination.79 Since
November 18, 1997, the life sentence option has included a life sentence without
possibility of parole.80
The appellate process following the imposition of a death sentence begins with a
request for clemency to the convening authority. The convening authority has
complete discretion to reduce both the crime of conviction and the punishment for
75. Id. § 10-31.00.
76. See R.C.M. 1006. This study shows that the commander typically follows the recommendation of
the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). (The advice of the SJA predicts the direction of commander’s referral 74% of
the time in the data collected.) Article 34 advice letters, see UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (2006), take a variety of
forms. Some SJAs provide an explicit recommendation in the letter. Often, however, the letter makes no
mention of a capital referral but the SJA prepares a charge sheet with the choice indicated and informs the
commanding officer that signing the sheet will implement the SJA’s recommendation. In a few cases in the
study, the letter tells the convening authority what must exist factually to justify a capital referral without a
suggestion of what the referral should be.
77. In many of the cases collected as part of the data that are not charged capitally, the decision of the
convening authority not to bring a capital case is based on a plea bargain in which the accused pleads guilty in
exchange for the convening authority’s waiver of the death penalty. In capitally charged cases, the capital
charge is often withdrawn by the convening authority in exchange for a guilty plea to the crime charged or a
less serious offense, in which event the accused escapes the risk of his or her case advancing to a capital
sentencing hearing with the government seeking a death sentence. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(B) (2008). In contrast to civilian courts, a military accused’s case may not
advance to a capital sentencing hearing on the basis of a guilty plea. Compare, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488
U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (“A plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal
elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence” (emphasis added)) with
R.C.M. 1004(a)(2) (permitting death to be adjudged only when an accused has been convicted by the concur-
rence of all the members of the court-martial who are present at the time a vote was taken, and thus excluding
the possibility of death when a defendant makes a guilty plea to a capital offense). If the government seeks a
death sentence, the case must be tried and sentenced by court-martial members. See R.C.M. 1004(a). A crucial
feature of the military system distinguishing it from its civilian counterparts is that plea bargains are strictly
within the authority of the convening authority rather than the judge advocates who prosecute the cases on
behalf of the government or the military judges who try the cases. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1),(3)
(describing the general federal plea agreement procedure in which an attorney for the government and the
defendant’s attorney, or defendant, may discuss and reach a plea agreement and the court’s subsequent con-
sideration of that plea agreement), with R.C.M. 705. Military prosecutors may, on their own motion, initiate
plea negotiations leading to a waiver of the death penalty and may propose such an agreement to the conven-
ing authority, but no plea bargain involving a waiver of the death penalty can go forward without the personal
consent of the convening authority. See R.C.M. 705(d).
78. R.C.M. 1004(a)(2) makes a condition precedent for the imposition of a death sentence the ac-
cused’s conviction of capital murder “by the concurrence of all the members of the court-martial.” Approxi-
mately 25% of the factually death-eligible accused whose cases advance to a capital court-martial escape the
risk of a death sentence at this stage of the process by virtue of a non-unanimous finding of guilt or a finding of
not guilty on the capital murder charge. See infra Part V.B., fig.2
79. See R.C.M. 1004(b)(4).
80. See 10 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2006).
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that crime.81 Convening authorities disallowed the death sentence in two of the
fifteen death sentences that have been issued by military courts since 1984. No
comparable authority exists in civilian courts.
For death sentences approved by the convening authority, appeals go to the
branch-specific courts of military review, the Court of Appeals of the Armed
Forces (CAAF), and the U.S. Supreme Court.82
IV. METHODOLOGY
A. The Data
The data for the study was collected by the authors for their analysis of the role
of race and other extra-legal factors within the U.S. Armed Forces’ capital punish-
ment system. The sample includes all 104 death-eligible murder cases prosecuted
by the armed forces between 1984 and 2005. As discussed in Part III, to be consid-
ered death-eligible the accused must have committed premeditated or felony mur-
der and there must be one or more statutory aggravator present in the case. For
each case, the data file includes more than 200 variables, relating to the character-
istics of the accused and victim(s), the nature of the crime, the case presented
against the accused, the defense presented, as well as any mitigation presented or
available, and each significant charging or sentencing recommendation or decision
in the case. In addition, the data includes a detailed narrative summary of each
case.
B. Research Design
As recommended by the literature discussed in Part II, for the purposes of this
study, a domestic homicide is defined as a non-predatory homicide in which the
accused killed his or her sexual intimate.83 In the study’s primary analysis, a sexual
intimate includes a current or former spouse or paramour.
There is one case included in the study that involved a non-predatory domestic
homicide in which a woman was the death-eligible defendant after she killed her
husband.84 As noted in Part II, while this case is included in the domestic subset, a
single case is not enough to analyze the impact of the gender of the accused or the
victim on the analysis.
Five cases in which the accused killed his wife for pecuniary gain were excluded
from the study as predatory homicides.85 The study’s subset of domestic homicides
81. R.C.M. 1107. The convening authority also has the power to reduce a life sentence to a term of
years. Id.
82. See R.C.M. 1203-05. In addition, the Supreme Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction over
CAAF’s decisions. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2006). At the present time, two death sentenced accused have
exhausted their military appeals through CAAF. In both cases, the accused have also exhausted direct appeals
through the Supreme Court. See Gray v. United States, 532 U.S. 919 (2001) (order denying cert.), reh’g denied,
532 U.S. 1035 (2001); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), habeus corpus denied by 68 M.J. 1 (2009).
83. See supra Part II.
84. In addition, one case involved a female accused, Lillie Morgan, who killed only her children. This
case is included in the parallel analysis of child-only cases but excluded from the primary analysis.
85. Charles Gardner (#135) arranged to have his wife killed so he could claim life insurance. Allen
Justice (#137) stabbed his wife to death when she refused to loan him money. Clayton Kaspers (#30) threw his
wife off a cliff with a co-perpetrator so he could claim life insurance proceeds. Joseph Thomas (#167.1, original
trial and sentencing, #167.2, re-sentencing) killed his wife with a tire iron to recover insurance proceeds. Here
and elsewhere, the numbers associated with each listed defendant denote the case numbers used in the study.
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also excludes cases in which the accused killed only his or her children.86 The pri-
mary analysis is replicated at each decision point for (a) all domestic killings in-
cluding predatory killings and (b) all domestic cases including those with only
children (“child-only cases”).
To analyze the impact of the fact of being a domestic homicide on the prosecu-
tion and sentencing of the death-eligible murders, the authors started from the
broadest and most superficial look at the data and progressed by factoring in the
impact of other legitimate and illegitimate factors at each stage of charging and
sentencing. The study highlights the importance of identifying and including these
control variables, as the unadjusted findings of across-the-board disparate treat-
ment are explained in part by the controls. The details of the analysis are presented
in Part V.
The authors hypothesized that cases in which the accused killed his or her inti-
mate would be treated more leniently at each stage of the military criminal justice
system than non-intimate cases.
V. THE ANALYSIS
A. Overview of the Domestic Homicides in Military Death-Eligible Cases
As noted above, a “domestic homicide” is a non-predatory homicide in which
the accused killed his or her sexual intimate. A sexual intimate includes a current
or former spouse or paramour. The primary analysis in the study focused on the
treatment of twenty-five domestic homicides.87
Seventeen of the crimes took place in the United States, six in Western Europe,
and two in Asia.88 The cases are distributed across the time period of the study
(1984 to 2005) in a roughly equal distribution, except that no case occurred after
2002.89 One domestic homicide resulted in a death sentence.90 In this case, James
Murphy received a death sentence for killing his wife, his stepson, and his son in
1989. His sentence was overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he
has not been resentenced.91
In twenty-four cases a male accused killed his present or former wife or female
paramour. In two of these cases, the accused also killed his child or children. In
two other of these cases, the accused also killed a second adult.92 In one case, the
86. The study included five cases in which the accused killed only his or her child or children: Jerry
Brown (#147), Kirkland Curry (#23), Lillie Morgan (#145), Fredrick Thomas (#90), and Melvin Turner (#991).
87. In addition to the twenty-five domestic homicides, there are five predatory domestic homicides and
five child only cases. There are a total of thirty possible cases when all variations in the definition are included.
88. Five of the six cases in Western Europe took place in Germany. The remaining case took place in
Spain. The Asian cases took place in Korea and the Philippines. All of the predatory domestic homicides took
place in the United States. Three of the child victim cases took place in the United States and two took place
in Germany.
89. The predatory cases occurred in 1989, 1990, 1992, and 1997. Two of the child victim cases occurred
between 1984 and 1993; three occurred in 1994 or later.
90. Two other cases that resulted in death sentences were excluded because they do not qualify as
domestic homicides under this study. The first prosecution of Joseph A. Thomas for predatory domestic homi-
cide resulted in a death sentence. Melvin Turner was sentenced to death for homicide of a child.
91. United States v. Murphy, 50 M.J. 4, 5–6, 15–16 (1998).
92. In two cases the victims are the accused’s wife and child or children (Fuhrman (#32), Murphy (#37)
respectively). In two cases, the accused killed his sexual intimate and a bystander (Strom (#43), Patterson
(#139)). In two cases, the accused killed two of the accused’s children or stepchildren and no adult (Curry
(#23), Morgan (#145)).
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accused is a woman who killed her husband. She is the only female accused and
her husband is the only male intimate victim in the domestic homicide subset.93
B. Unadjusted Results
In order to study whether death-eligible cases involving a domestic homicide
are less likely to be prosecuted as capital cases or less likely to receive death
sentences than those cases that are not domestic homicides, the authors first ex-
amined how the cases progress through charging, conviction, and sentencing deci-
sions without regard to culpability. Figure 2 (below) presents the percentage of the
total death-eligible cases that are domestic homicides and the percentage that are
domestic homicides after each decision.
FIGURE 2. Unadjusted Evidence of a Domestic Discount in Capital Charging
and Sentencing Among All Death-Eligible Cases: U.S. Armed Forces,
1984–2005 (showing the percentage of domestic homicide cases among all death-
eligible cases and among cases at successive stages of charging and sentencing)
A B C D
Death Sentencing 
Among All Death-
Eligible Cases (n=96) 
Decision to 








Sentence to Death 
(n=30)
Domestic:            25 
All Other:            79 
Total Cases:       104 
Domestic:           8 
All Other:          36 
Total Cases:      44 
Domestic:            5 
All Other:           25 
Total Cases:       30 
Domestic:        1 
All Other:       14 





*The percentage point measure between Columns B and C indicates the 17-point 
decrease in the representation rates of domestic homicides between Columns A and D. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that domestic homicides make up 24% of all death-eligi-
ble homicides identified between 1984 and 2005 (Column A). The representation
rate of domestic cases falls to 18% when the subset of cases is limited to those in
which the convening authority sought the death penalty (Column B). A slight de-
cline in the representation rate of domestic homicides appears between the deci-
sion to seek the death penalty documented in Column B and the decision to
advance the case to a capital sentencing hearing documented in Column C. Do-
mestic homicides make up 17% of the cases in which the convening authority ad-
93. A second woman accused killed her children and not her husband (Morgan (#145)).
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vanced the case to a capital sentencing hearing. Column D shows that domestic
homicides make up only 7% of the death-eligible cases in which death sentences
were imposed. There is an overall seventeen-point decline in the representation
rate of domestic homicides between the full set of all death-eligible cases, docu-
mented in Column A, and the cases in which a death sentence is imposed, docu-
mented in Column D.94
To evaluate the significance of the seventeen point decline, the authors com-
pared the rates at which domestic and non-domestic homicide cases advanced
through each decision point in the prosecution and sentencing of death-eligible
cases. This comparison remains unadjusted. It presumed all cases are alike with
respect to culpability and race. Table 1 (below) presents this comparison and con-
tinues to support the hypothesis that a crime’s domestic homicide status may have
a mitigating influence on charging and sentencing decisions in the system.
TABLE 1. Unadjusted Domestic Homicide Disparities in Charging and
Sentencing Outcomes in Death-Eligible Cases: U.S. Armed Forces, 1984–2005











































Part 2. Disparities 
3 Difference in 
Rates
(Row 1–Row 2) 
–14 points 
(4–18)
p = .10 
–14 points 
(32–46)
p = .26 
–12 points 
(22–34)
p = .31 
–36 points 
(20–56)
p = .33 
4 Relative Risk









Significance is reported using Fisher’s exact test of two-sided probabilities.
While none of the disparities of the comparison are significant at the 0.05 level,
the consistency and magnitude of the disparities warrant notice. At every stage of
the charging and sentencing process, domestic cases advance through the system at
a lower rate than nondomestic cases. In addition, the fourteen-point disparity
among all death-eligible cases documented in Table 1, Part 2, Row 3, Column A is
94. If the predatory homicides are included in the analysis, there is a twenty-point decline between all
death-eligible cases and the cases in which a death sentence is imposed (Column A: 33%, n=30; Column B:
23%, n=10; Column C: 23%, n=7; Column D: 13%, n=2). With the child only cases included, there is a sixteen-
point decline (Column A: 29%, n=30; Column B: 23%, n=10; Column C: 20%, n=6; Column D: 13%, n=2).
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significant at the 0.10 level. Part 2, Row 3, Column B, documents that the conven-
ing authority advances domestic cases to a capital court martial at a significantly
lower rate than nondomestic cases. Likewise, Column C documents a twelve-point
disparity between domestic homicide cases and nondomestic homicide cases in the
rates that the cases advance to a capital sentencing hearing. Column C, Row 4, also
documents that the risk of advancing to a capital sentencing hearing for domestic
homicides is 65% of the risk for all other homicides. The largest disparity, how-
ever, appears in the final life versus death decision, presented in Column D. The
death sentencing rate is thirty-six percentage points lower for domestic homicides
than for nondomestic homicides. The pattern is similar if predatory homicides, or
the cases in which the accused killed only his or her children, are included.95
These unadjusted disparities clearly suggest that a domestic discount may be
influencing charging and sentencing decisions at each stage of the process, espe-
cially in the final sentencing decisions.
C. Adjusted Findings
The next step in the analysis was to determine if the identified disparities re-
mained after factoring in the culpability and racial characteristics of the cases. To
introduce controls for criminal culpability, logistic regression models were devel-
oped for each stage of the charging and sentencing process. Previous work on capi-
tal punishment charging and sentencing and, in particular, prior analysis of the
military capital punishment dataset in the context of the authors’ larger race study
informed the identification of theoretically or practically important control vari-
ables for the study.96 The core models from the previous charging and sentencing
study provided the foundation for this analysis controlling for culpability and race.
In addition, the authors analyzed a number of variables unique to the domestic
homicide subset, such as the presence of evidence of habitual beating or a prior
attempt on the victim’s life.97 The goal at each phase was to identify the factors,
other than the relationship between the accused and the victim, that might be in-
fluencing sentencing decisions at each phase. Next the study controlled for the
factors, that is, factored them into the analysis, before considering the influence of
the domestic variable.
Table 2 (below) presents the results of this analysis for each stage of charging
and sentencing. The question at each stage was whether the fact of being a domes-
tic homicide has an aggravating or mitigating effect; that is, whether domestic cases
95. For domestic homicides including predatory cases, the disparities are as follows: Column A: –12
points (7%–19%); Column B: –13 points. (33%–46%); Column C: –9 points (25%–34%); Column D: –28
points (57%–29%). For nonpredatory domestic homicides including child-only victim cases, the disparities are
as follows: Column A: –12 points (19%-7%); Column B: –13 points (46%–33%); Column C: –14 points
(35%–21%); and Column D: –21 points (54%–33%).
96. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 254–67 (1990) (reviewing studies of capital
punishment systems between 1980 and 1990); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in
the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the
Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 215–26 (2003) (reviewing studies of capital punishment between
1990 and 2003).
97. These variables were the following: accused previously attempted to kill the victim; evidence of a
history of assaultative conduct by the accused against the victim; accused’s prior announced intention to kill
the victim (to a third party); and accused planned the homicide for more than five minutes.
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TABLE 2. Domestic Homicide Disparities Overall and in Successive Stages of
Charging and Sentencing, Unadjusted and Adjusted for Alternative
Combinations of Culpability Measures: U.S. Armed Forces, 1984–2005






























Part 1. Unadjusted Effects, 
Domestic Homicide 
0.19 –1.65
p = .12 
0.56 –0.58





Part 2.  Adjusted Effects 
A.  Domestic Homicide 0.37 –0.98p = .40 
1.98 .68





B.  Control Variables 
1.  Number of aggra-
vating circumstances 2.66 .98 5.19 1.64*** 1.39 0.32 3.02 1.10
2.  Multiple victims 9.31 2.23*** 12.57 2.53** 8.39 2.12** 3.30 1.19
3.  Accused slashed throat 
of victim --- --- 19.61 2.98*** --- --- --- ---
4.  Hate or revenge 
motive 7.64 2.03** --- --- --- --- 4.06 1.40
5.  Killing involved a 
bizarre weapon 6.10 1.94 --- --- >100 4.63*** 1.97 0.68
6.  Substantial forensic or 
physical evidence --- --- 18.31 2.91*** 4.81 1.57** --- ---
7.  Accused took 
responsibility for crime --- --- 0.21 –3.88*** 0.04 –3.16 --- ---
8.  Accused provided 
support to family --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.22 –1.50
9.  Defense of insufficient 
evidence --- --- 5.76 1.75** --- --- --- ---
10.  Militarily implicated 11.14 2.41*** 19.90 2.99*** 5.61 1.72** 3.80 1.33
11.  Offense date after 
1990 .25 –1.37 .10 –2.28*** .37 –0.98 0.85 –0.17
12.  Case involves at least 
one white victim --- --- --- --- 21.24 3.06** --- ---
* p < .10; ** p < .05;
*** p < .01 r
2
=.54 r2=.73 r2=.55 r2=.49
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are more or less likely to be advanced to the more aggressive outcomes, such as a
capital prosecution, a capital conviction, and a death sentence.
Part 1 of Table 2 presents unadjusted effects. This part shows the impact of
being a domestic homicide on prosecution and sentencing choices without regard
to any other factor. It replicates the analysis in Table 1 using a different methodol-
ogy. Part 1 is included as a point of comparison to the results documented in Part
2.98
Part 2 of Table 2 presents the adjusted disparities for domestic homicide status
in Section A and the controls included in each regression model (in Section B).
Columns A–D present the four different models. The model in Column A ad-
dresses all decisions in the dataset overall. The models in columns B–D focus on
each significant decision point in the prosecution and sentencing process. The pres-
ence of a number in a given column cell indicates that the specified variable was
included in the model defined at the top of the column. Most variables were in-
cluded because the analysis shows they were significant to the decision. The au-
thors also included a few theoretically important variables even though those
variables’ impacts were not statistically significant. Three dashes in a column indi-
cate that the variable was not statistically or theoretically significant at that deci-
sion point.
Given the literature and the theoretical importance of aggravating factors in
capital sentencing, the authors included in every model the variable for the num-
ber of aggravating circumstances and the offense date.99 Each was most important
in the model of the convening authority’s decision to seek the death penalty (Part
2.B, Column B). The clear importance of the control for offense date was limited
to this model, but it is consistently mitigating across all four models.
Different control variables entered different models as would be expected when
each model deals with a different subset of cases and the cases relate to death-
eligible murder. Race of defendant and race of victim were always included as
variables that could step into the model. Only the race-of-victim variable came in
to the model as significant, and only in the second decision point (n=30), recorded
in Part 2.B, Row 12, Column C.
Finally, the reader should note that none of the controls considered in Table 2,
Column D, are statistically significant in the fourth stage, death sentencing. The
controls in this model are based on the model of death sentencing among all death-
eligible cases in Column A. The limited sample size at this decision point makes it
particularly difficult to rely on a test of significance to determine the impact of
variables.
After identifying a model for each stage, the authors introduced the domestic
homicide variable. Part 2.A in Table 2, shows the odds ratios, regression coeffi-
cients (ß), and significance level for the domestic homicide variable. The 0.37 ad-
justed odds ratio in Part 2.A, Column A suggests that the fact of being a domestic
homicide may be mitigating overall in the system. Specifically, the odds of a death
sentence imposed among all death-eligible cases are only a third of the odds faced
98. Compare tbl.1, supra Part V.B, with tbl.2, pt. 1.
99. Aggravating circumstances in death sentencing statutes are intended to measure culpability. The
presence of an aggravating circumstance should indicate increased culpability. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 277
(9th ed. 2009).
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by accused in other cases. The reader should note, however, that the odds increase
from 0.19 to 0.37 after the introduction of controls.100
Replacing the domestic homicide variable with the expanded variable for do-
mestic homicides including the five predatory homicides in this model decreased
the mitigating effect to 0.81 (p=0.83). This outcome is consistent with the expecta-
tion that predatory domestic homicides would be treated more aggressively than
passionate domestic homicides.101 In contrast, introducing the expanded variable
for domestic homicides (including the five child-only victim cases) increased the
mitigating effect, producing a variable of 0.36 (p=0.32).
The p-values are presented in Table 2 below the findings in Part 2.A. None of
the findings are statistically significant, perhaps, at least in part, due to the small
samples. Because the p-values are not significant, the findings must be treated as
merely suggestive. Nonetheless, the 0.37 odds multiplier, reported in Part 2.A, Col-
umn A, is a sizeable coefficient with practical significance in understanding the
treatment of death-eligible murder cases in this criminal justice system.
Column B of Table 2 examines the decision to advance a case to a capital court
martial. At this stage, unexpectedly, being a domestic homicide has a small aggra-
vating effect with a small positive coefficient, as reflected in the odds ratio of 1.98
in Part 2.A, Column B. The aggravating effect increases and approaches signifi-
cance when the domestic homicide variable is replaced with the expanded variable
that includes the five predatory murders (5.32), and approaches significance
(p=0.06), but the aggravating effect decreases and loses significance when it is re-
placed with the variable that includes child-only victim cases in the domestic subset
(1.64, p=0.55).
Likewise in the logistic regression model for the decision to proceed to a capital
sentencing hearing, documented in Column C, being a domestic homicide has a
small aggravating effect, as reflected in the odds ratio of 2.00 in Table 2, Part 2.A.
Again, this aggravating effect increases with the inclusion of predatory domestic
homicides (4.33, p=0.08) and decreases with the inclusion of child-only victim cases
(1.23, p=0.81).
The outcomes documented in Table 2, columns B and C, stand in contrast with
the outcomes documented in Column D. The model for the decision to impose a
death sentence in a capital sentencing hearing suggests that being a domestic homi-
cide has a strong mitigating effect on court-martial member’s decisions to impose a
death sentence. The 0.34 odds ratio suggests that domestic homicides face about
one-third the odds of receiving a death sentence in a capital sentencing hearing as
compared with all other cases.102 The overall domestic discount, documented in
Column A (a 0.37 odds ratio), clearly reflects the impact of the decisions of mem-
bers that is modeled in Column D (a 0.34 odds ratio). The influence of the inclu-
sion of the predatory murders persists in the final decision to impose a death
sentences. The odds remain low after including predatory murders, but increase to
0.72 (p=0.80). Including the child-only victim cases in the domestic homicide subset
100. Compare tbl.2, pt.1, col.A, with tbl.2, pt.2.A, col.A.
101. See supra Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra notes 13, 55–58 and accompanying text.
102. See tbl.2, pt.2.A, col.D (reporting a 0.34 odds ratio for a imposing a death sentence in a domestic
homicide case).
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decreases the mitigating effect the subset has on the decision to impose death
sentences to 0.85 (p=0.89).
When this model is limited to those variables showing statistical significance,
only the variables for multiple victims (Part 2.B, Row 2) and the presence of a hate
or revenge motive come into the model.103 In this more limited model, the odds
ratio for domestic homicides falls to 0.26. When the predatory murders are in-
cluded in the domestic subset, the odds decrease to 0.51 (p=0.53). When the child-
only cases are included in the domestic subset, the odds decrease to 0.59 (p=0.64).
The findings presented in Table 2, columns B and C, undermine the suggestion
that the convening authority applies a “domestic discount.” Rather, they clearly
suggest that the domestic discount in the military capital punishment system is the
product of the life and death decisions made by court-martial members’ in penalty
trials.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The study described contributes to the understanding of whether a domestic
discount operates in the military capital punishment system, and, if so, how the
discount operates. It also endorses earlier findings regarding the importance of
well-controlled stage-wise analyses of issues relating to the administration of the
death penalty or the criminal justice system in general.
First, as noted in Part V, the study’s results lend qualified support for the pro-
position that a domestic discount operates in sentencing decisions in the military
capital punishment system. Whatever effect a domestic discount may have, it ap-
pears to be almost entirely the product of the court-martial members’ death sen-
tencing decisions rather than the product of decisions made by the convening
authority.
Second, the importance of the year of crime in this analysis echoes the finding
of Dawson as to the importance of controlling for date.104 As noted in Part II,
Dawson found the limited domestic discount in her study to result entirely from
cases that entered the system in 1984 or earlier. She hypothesized that society and
public officials may have become more sensitive to domestic violence over the
period of her study.105 Here however, the study’s findings are contrary to Dawson’s
and the domestic discount is stronger in the more recent cases than it is in the
older cases.
The convening authority brought 50% of the domestic homicides as capital
cases between 1984 and 1990 (6/12), but brought 15% of the domestic homicides as
capital cases after 1990 (2/13). Juries’ guilt and sentencing decisions also appear
more punitive toward domestic homicides in the earlier period of the study. Juries
found domestic homicide defendants guilty in 40% of the cases between 1984 and
1990 (4/10) but in only 8% of the cases after 1990 (1/13). The single death sentence
103. See tbl.2, pt.2.B, rows 2 & 4.
104. Compare tbl.2, pt.2.B, row 11, supra Part V.C (indicating the importance of the date variable), with
Dawson, supra note 14, at 109, 126.
105. See Dawson, supra note 14, at 109, 126 (discussing the legislative and policy initiatives intended to
change the way police, prosecutors, and courts respond to domestic violence, and noting the impact of time on
her findings).
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among the twenty-five domestic homicides considered in the study was prosecuted
during the earlier period.
The impact of time in this analysis may reflect an overall trend in the military
capital punishment system away from aggressive prosecution of capital cases that
do not implicate the command and control of the military.106 The variable for of-
fense date, however, is consistently mitigating in the models in Table 2 even though
the models control separately for the military implications of the crime.107 This
trend may also support the conclusion that legislative and policy initiatives in-
tended to change public responses to domestic violence generally and, in particu-
lar, in the U.S. Armed Forces, have not impacted the actors involved in military
capital prosecutions. It is difficult, however, to make such a strong conclusion from
such a small sample. This finding suggests the importance of replicating this study
in jurisdictions with a larger number of domestic homicides.
Separate coding and analysis of predatory and passionate domestic homicides
also appears to merit replication in future studies. The findings here lend support
to Rapaport’s suggestion that research on domestic violence and homicide law
ought to focus on passionate homicides rather than predatory ones.108 As noted in
Part V, in every instance where the study’s domestic homicide subset included the
predatory domestic homicides, the evidence of discount diminished and the evi-
dence of aggressive prosecution increased.109
This finding is most pronounced in the analysis of the decision to bring a case to
a capital court martial (the charging decision) and the conviction decision. Includ-
ing the predatory domestic homicides in the domestic violence subset increases the
odds of a case receiving a capital charge from 1.98 to 5.32. The odds are more than
two and one-half times greater. Likewise, the chance of a case receiving a capital
conviction increases from 2.00 to 4.33 upon the inclusion of the predatory homi-
cides, again more than doubling the odds. This finding suggests that the inclusion
of predatory crimes in previous analyses of the domestic discount may be dis-
torting conclusions regarding the treatment of (passionate) domestic homicides.
Separate coding and analysis of child-victim only cases also merits replication in
a study with a larger number of cases. Adding the five child-victim only cases had
an inconsistent effect in the study. The inclusion makes almost no change on the
discount in the overall analysis of death sentencing among all death-eligible cases
(presented in Column A of Table 2, 0.37 versus 0.37), but decreases the aggravat-
ing effect in charging decisions, (shown in Column B, 1.98 versus 1.69) and de-
creases the aggravating effect in the decision to advance to a capital sentencing
hearing (Column C, 2.00 versus 1.23). This outcome may be surprising to some, as
many jurisdictions, including the military, include a separate statutory aggravator
106. See generally Catherine M. Grosso, David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, The Impact of Civilian
Aggravating Factors on the Military Death Penalty: Another Chapter in the Resistance of the Armed Forces to
the Civilianization of Military Justice, 1984–85, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569 (2010).
107. See tbl.2, pt.2.B, row 11, supra Part V.C (documenting the mitigating effect of time on the decision
to advance domestic homicides towards capital punishment).
108. See Rapaport, Capital Murder, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
109. See supra Part V.C.
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for killing a child in the death penalty statutes or rules.110 On the other hand, the
outcome may just reflect unique difficulties in prosecuting child-only cases.111 In-
troduction of the child-only victim cases decreases the mitigating effect of the do-
mestic variable in the final death sentencing decisions (0.34 to 0.85).
Finally, these results highlight again the importance of focusing on individual
decision points in case analyses and of including appropriate controls. The dispari-
ties that appeared across the board in Table 1 are confined to the final decision,
documented in Table 2, Column D, where appropriate controls were introduced.
Likewise, the apparently overall mitigating effect that appears in Column A of
Table 2 can be understood more precisely through the decision-specific models in
Columns B–D.
The findings of the study suggest the need for additional well-controlled, stage-
wise, studies on the importance of the relationship between the defendant and the
victim on charging and sentencing decisions.
110. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1004 (c)(7)(K) (2008) (“The victim of
the murder was under 15 years of age.”). See supra Part III.A (quoting the Manual for Courts Martial R.C.M.
1004(c)(2)).
111. See discussion supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.

